January 17, 2010

  • A response to Ashis Nandy’s “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Toleranc

    Basically Nandy is
    a religious man trying to excuse inexcusable acts by religious men on
    the grounds that they wouldn’t have happened if it weren’t for other,
    secularist men. Keep this absurd undercurrent in mind as you read my
    response; whatever else there is to say about this essay, keep in
    mind just how crazy it is to
    blame sectarian violence on secularism, how obviously backward the
    reasoning
    must be necessarily.

    I’m
    being required to read this essay for a class, a seminar on “politics
    of religion and secularism” run by a professor who is the worst
    kind of faitheist. He actually tried to claim that people can and
    should believe in faith as trust in God without believing in faith as
    belief in God. Stop for a moment and think about what this would
    mean: I trust my mother to tell me the right things, but of course my
    mother doesn’t actually exist. I believe that unicorns will make the
    world a better place, but of course there are no such things as
    unicorns. (He admitted that my logic is undeniable, yet didn’t seem
    to care; this was all the more frustrating, since it implies that he
    has forsaken rational thought.) Yes, this is the state-of-the-art in
    faitheist discourse.

    It
    was this paragraph that inspired me to blog a response:
    “Secularism
    has little to say about cultures—it is definitionally ethnophobic
    and frequently ethnocidal, unless of course cultures and those living
    by cultures are willing to show total subservience to the modern
    nation-state and become ornaments or adjuncts to modern living—and
    the orthodox secularists have no clue to the way a religion can link
    up different faiths or ways of life according to its own
    configurative principles.”

    Whatever this is, it isn’t secularism.
    Secularism as I understand it—as I advocate it—is explicitly
    pluralistic; it destroys “cultures” only in the sense that it
    integrates culture—gives
    access to cultural arts and experiences from all societies for all
    human beings. It destroys
    us-them thinking,
    not cultural complexity. My secularism is reading the Bhagavad-Gita
    while standing in the Sistine Chapel and wearing a kilt and a
    Bluetooth headset. In the future I imagine, there would be no
    Muslims, no Catholics, no Buddhists, only
    humans, humans
    who are social and cultural animals. I’ve no love of the
    nation-state; I think it is at present a necessary evil, and I would
    very much like to see it die in favor of a species-state or indeed an
    ecosystem-state. Government is clearly effective at securing
    stability and preventing violence; but nationalism is fundamentally
    evil.

    Nandy
    makes a distinction early in the essay that he hardly ever uses
    later, between “religion-as-faith” and “religion-as-ideology”
    (I would use instead the words “religion-as-culture” and
    “religion-as-belief”, but the taxonomy is similar); insofar as
    this distinction works, I agree with it wholeheartedly, as would any
    of the New Atheists. Richard Dawkins says grace and celebrates
    Christmas. Sam Harris often writes of the wisdom in Buddhist
    literature. Salman Rushdie frequently speaks about the Muslim
    cultural values he believes in. The people who have made a false
    association between these two categories are not the atheists, they
    are the religionists; they are the people who think that you can’t
    respect the Bible as literature without believing that Jesus rose
    from the dead. A pluralistic, metaphorical, cultural experience of
    religion
    is precisely what we New Atheists are trying to
    achieve.
    If that’s really what
    you want, you
    agree with us.

    Nandy
    also goes on about “theories of self” without any actual
    evidence; all the psychological evidence I’ve studied shows that
    people around the world, regardless of cultural identification, are
    capable of both a fixed and a fluid concept of self.

    Nandy’s
    conception of “two definitions of secularism” is more useful; he
    is right that “be religious at home, but secular in public” is a
    highly problematic notion. This is why we New Atheists argue for “be
    secular
    everywhere”;
    we think religious belief and religious ideology are fundamentally
    evil things, and would like to see them eradicated. Separation of
    Church and State only makes sense if we agree that there must be such
    a thing as Church; New Atheists precisely deny this. On the other
    hand, Nandy’s second definition is even worse: respect for all
    religions is precisely the opposite of what makes rational sense.
    Respect for ideas and practices must be
    earned by
    the validity of those ideas and practices.

    “His
    contemporary, Joseph Bradlaugh, on the other hand, believed in a
    secularism which rejected religion and made science its deity.”
    Well, except for the idiocy of saying “science its deity”—clearly
    you know nothing of science and little of theology, for science is a
    methodology, not an ideology, and it is nothing even remotely like a
    being—this is in fact the secularism I agree with. Science is true,
    religion is false; we need no further reason to believe science and
    reject religion.

    He
    then speaks of a hierarchy of belief; the only change I would make is
    to say that people who are religious in public but not in private are
    the
    worst kind of
    people, worse even than true believers. The first two I entirely
    agree with: Rationalists are better than secular theists who are
    better than everyone else.

    Nandy
    is a fan of ridiculous proclamations about secularism; I doubt anyone
    seriously thinks that Britain dominated India because Britain was
    secular and India wasn’t. I certainly don’t think that—gunpowder
    and industrialization are far more obvious reasons. Moreover, it’s
    clear that the violence in “secular” Ireland is motivated as much
    by cultural and religious identity as the violence in “religious”
    India.

    I
    feel no obligation to defend the way India was run by the British;
    while secular, it was also evil in plenty of other ways.

    And
    yet another ridiculous proclamation:
    “To
    many Indians today, secularism comes as a part of a larger package
    consisting of a set of standardized ideological products and social
    processes—development, mega-science, and national security being
    some of the most prominent among them.”
    So
    far this is true, except I’m not sure what “mega-science” is as
    distinct from plain old
    science.
    “This package often plays the same role vis-a-vis”

    (anytime someone says “vis-a-vis”, expect nonsense to follow;
    it’s an effective heuristic)
    “the
    people of society—sanctioning or justifying violence against the
    weak and the dissenting—that the church, the
    ulema,
    the sangha,
    or the Brahmans played in
    earlier times.”
    And now
    he’s gone off the deep end. I challenge you to name
    one—just
    one—New Atheist who
    has
    once—just
    once—advocated
    violence against religious people. You can’t do it, can you? And yet,
    I can find
    thousands of
    examples of religious people advocating violence against people who
    disagree with their religion. Maybe
    millions. The
    closest example I can find in secularism comes from Communist
    tyrants; yet, none of them were actually rational, none of them
    believed in Enlightenment values, and all of them were insane
    megalomaniacs. That isn’t secularism, it’s madness. Such people are
    beyond the pale of moral behavior, and I do not consider them my
    allies.

    Nandy
    also likes making assertions without evidence, or even in the face of
    obvious counter-evidence:
    “Finally,
    the belief that values derived from the secular ideology of the
    state”
    (like
    freedom, equality, justice, the
    dignity of humanity?) “
    would
    be a better guide to political action and a more tolerant and richer
    political life”
    (like
    that actually enjoyed in secular countries?)
    “(as
    compared to the values derived from the religious faiths)”

    (like racism, sexism, bigotry, genocide, sectarian violence,
    irrationality? Oh, and “don’t kill people”, because that’s not a
    value secularists believe in?)
    “has
    become even more untenable to large parts of Indian society than it
    was a decade ago.”

    Only
    when he actually makes substantive historical claims does Nandy begin
    to sound reasonable:
    “It
    is not modern India which has tolerated Judaism in India for nearly
    2000 years, Christianity from before the time it went to Europe, and
    Zoroastrianism for more than 1200 years; it is traditional India
    which has shown such tolerance.”
    This
    could indeed be correct; I somewhat doubt it, given the history of
    sectarian violence in the rest of the world, but perhaps its true. If
    so, all that shows is that the
    forced
    transition
    to
    modernity causes violence—something I do not doubt. It does nothing
    to show that
    modernity
    itself
    is harmful—to do that, Nandy would need to show that Sweden is a
    more violent and horrifying place than India or indeed Congo or Saudi
    Arabia. I’m fairly certain he can’t do this. And even so, Nandy
    trusts ancient records to be accurate and comprehensive, which is an
    absurd trust to have. Even if no one
    wrote
    about
    violence,
    that doesn’t mean violence wasn’t happening. Maybe it wasn’t—but we
    simply don’t know. What few written records we have from the time
    period (ahem,
    The
    Bible? The Qur’an?
    )
    are simply chock-full of genocidal violence, depicted as if it is
    completely normal and acceptable.

    In
    general, Nandy hates modernity because it challenges his own
    religious beliefs, and he is trying to convince us that modern times
    are more violent than the past, when the evidence shows precisely the
    opposite. Even the most horrible acts of modern times—Hitler,
    Stalin, Pol Pot—were the sort of act that was commonplace in
    ancient times. The Bible, the Qur’an, the Odyssey, the Aeneid… all
    the ancient texts we have verify that life was brutally violent for
    everyone. Genocide used to be a way of life for religious humanity.
    We feel more violent now paradoxically because we are less violent;
    we are more
    aware
    of
    the violence and how terrible it is, so when we do still see it on
    occasion we are more horrified by it.

    Overall,
    I am convinced that Nandy has nothing useful to say, because he
    systematically distorts secular ideology in order to defend some
    weird form of “religion” that no one actually believes—except
    perhaps we New Atheists.

Comments (1)

  • Hi,
    I am an atheist from India and I really enjoyed your post.

    Nandy’s comment on modern India’s lack of tolerance is not wholly correct. The caste system of ancient India
    was much more intolerant and inflexible than any display of religious intolerance today.
    And anyway, it’s ironic to accuse modernity of reducing religious fanaticism. Fundamentalist religion is a sign
    of medieval thinking and not modern (or ancient) secularism.

    Jyothis

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