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Name: Patrick
Country: United States
State: Michigan
Metro: Ann Arbor
Gender: Male


Interests: Friendship, love, writing, psychology, physics, philosophy, ethics, science, photography, art, gaming, technology, computing
Expertise: My skills are primarily in writing, science, and mathematics, though I have a knack for Latin, I'm pretty good at painting and photography, and I'm not atrocious at drawing, singing, or composing. Not much of an athlete, nor do I care to be, though I do try to stay fit and eat right. I'm still working on that whole relationship business. Love is hard to find.
Occupation: Student, Researcher, Author
Industry: Literature, Science, Education


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Member Since: 5/3/2005
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Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Utilitarianism is not cold

[JD 2455154]

It is often alleged that utilitarianism, even in its most nuanced variants, is "cold" or "heartless" in some way---that the rational calculation of consequences entails a sort of devaluing of human life. (In this post I will be using the word "utilitarianism" broadly to describe any theory of consequentialism that considers all consequences to be ultimately commensurable, such that it would be justified to commit any evil act given that it was the only way to achieve some sufficiently great good. There are a few kinds of consequentialism that don't operate this way, but they are the minority.)

This is a common intuition, and I don't think it is completely without foundation; but I am convinced that it is ultimately mistaken. While it might seem unconscionable to allow (e.g.) rape, murder, genocide in order to achieve some greater good, ultimately this revulsion comes from a failure of imagination regarding just how great that greater good would need to be. To justify a genocide, it would not be enough that the world would be better off without the targeted group; rather, it would have to be that without the genocide a far more terrible outcome would have occurred, like the total destruction of human civilization. Further, there must have been no other way to prevent such a terrible outcome---otherwise we ought to take that other path.

There is a kind of utilitarianism that is cold; the most naive Benthamite act-utilitarianism seems quite cold. If all we are measuring is subjective pleasure versus subjective pain, we ignore not only aesthetics and honesty, but indeed autonomy and death! To a Benthamite utilitarian, a painless death is morally neutral, and there is nothing wrong with benevolent slavery. Indeed, under such a philosophy something like the Matrix---a false but pleasant reality imposed upon us through delusion---is not only permissible, but good; it may even be obligatory. This seems quite cold indeed, but it is dangerously close to a straw man; no serious modern utilitarian would defend these notions. Indeed, nearly all utilitarians today agree with John Stuart Mill, and adopt a system of consequences that includes not only pleasure and pain simpliciter, but also the "pleasure" of aesthetics, the "pain" of fearing death, the "pleasure" of autonomy, the "pain" of dishonesty. One could argue that these experiences aren't really pleasure and pain, but in fact something broader, like attractive and aversive emotions generally (in fact, I would argue precisely this); but the point remains that serious utilitarianism today considers this broad range of experiences and not a simplistic calculation of subjective pleasure versus subjective pain. If the sense of coldness came from Benthamite utilitarianism, basically the argument is one of guilt by association.

Moreover, it seems to me that the other moral theories on offer are not only just as cold---they are in fact significantly colder. They value the wrong things, and turn a blind eye to suffering when preventing it would require us to sacrifice our moral righteousness.

In the first case, virtue theory values something like "human flourishing" or a "completeness of character" above all else. As such, a virtue theorist is committed to saying that if I must allow a million people to suffer and die in order to preserve my completeness of character, I not only may do so, in fact I ought to do so---it would be wrong of me to sacrifice my character to save that million people. What could be colder than that?

In the second case, deontology demands that we obey moral rules under all circumstances, without exception or hesitation. A deontologist is committed to saying that we must never break the rules---never kill an innocent person, or in Kant's infamous case, never even tell a lie---regardless of how many people must suffer as a result. Pacifism is a particularly extreme deontology in which the rule is literally "thou shalt not kill"; killing human beings is absolutely forbidden regardless of the circumstances. It's not hard to see how a nation of pacifists would be rapidly invaded and exploited by foreign powers.In essence, deontology values clean hands over all else: Regardless of whom it hurts, I must never dirty my hands with evil actions. This doesn't seem as cold as virtue theory, but it still seems quite cold!

On the other hand, one could devise a virtue theory or deontology that didn't have such terrible consequences; the most obvious way would be to define the virtues and rules such that they are based upon the predicted consequences. But once we've done this, aren't we really talking about utilitarianism anyway? If "virtue" is that which will make one likely to do good, and the "rules" are heuristics that are likely to produce good outcomes---that's utilitarianism! It's a nuanced Millian sort of utilitarianism, but that's what utilitarians have been advocating anyway.


Monday, November 09, 2009

Virulent Senioritis

This has not been a good semester for me. I suffered H1N1 influenza, I experienced a relapse in my depression and migraines; I have been getting mediocre grades (Bs and Cs instead of As); I've done basically nothing on my honors thesis after being completely discouraged by a lack of support from professors.

It could just be luck: The infection and subsequent recovery triggered my depression, which triggered my migraines; the combination of the three and the resulting loss of attendance and focus has damaged my academic success. I have ambitious research plans that are difficult to achieve, and I reasonably expected better support in my research than I actually received; thereby I became discouraged.

But it could also be subconscious or semi-conscious intentions on my part. I stand before a crossroads in my life, with many options laid out before me. I could go on to graduate school; I could join the Peace Corps; I could seek a teaching fellowship; I could combine these things through Peace Corps Master's International; I could take a year off to finish my book; and there are thousands of other options I might sometimes be tempted to consider but would generally consider less viable.

And in the face of all these options, I am afraid, or anxious,or some similar aversive emotion. I fear that I will make the wrong choice, or that I won't be given the opportunity I deserve. I feel as a tiny kayak on a fast and forking river, trying desperately to choose my course as I am swept ahead. I feel that I need time to consider these options, time to reflect upon my true goals and aspirations, time to plan my future. And yet I am not being given this time; the hours and days and months carry me relentlessly closer to graduation.

"Life is what happens when you're busy making other plans" said John Lennon, and a month later he'd been murdered. I am continually reminded of this thought, because it is so troubling to me. I don't want my life to be so random, so far beyond my control.

I want time to think about what I want to do in my life; I want time to develop deeper theories of the Hard Problem; I want time to write my books. I want to shunt a log across the river so that I can plan my course.

I'm not sure this is a reasonable desire; life goes on regardless of what we want. Yet at the same time, I see so many people around me with no plans, no dreams, simply carried forth into lives in which they will ultimately be unhappy and unfulfilled. Worse, even if they are happy, they are unlikely to achieve great good in the world; some might be satisfied with helping only those near to them, but I feel a deep drive to achieve something great, something lasting. In order to do that I need to seriously reflect upon the best path for myself.

Perhaps I should take the next semester off? That's the closest I can see to shunting the river. I could spend the winter of 2010 reflecting, then come back in 2010-2011 to finish my degree. This feels unappealing to me... I think this is primarily because it seems "weak" or like "surrender". I feel as if I am giving in to my anxiety—or even to my depression. I am "losing" some sort of "battle".

Alternatively, with significant effort I could psych myself back to full potential, finish my degree in time. This latter plan raises additional questions: Should I cancel my honors thesis? What should I do after graduation—and shouldn't I be applying to these things now?

Increasingly I'm thinking time off is warranted. I'd need to make sure that I use the time—that it isn't just wasted—but I think I could do that. The sense of "weakness" or "surrender" increasingly seems a poor reason for choosing a particular direction in my life. Indeed, I feel a sense of relief simply from proposing the option: Even if I ultimately decide not to do so, I have found a way to shunt the river. Will my parents be disappointed? Will others think less of me? Possibly—though not necessarily. And even if I make the wrong choice, there will be time to change that decision—many people change careers well into middle age. I could stay on this path now and change later.

Yet this is my life, and my life's direction that I am trying to decide. I want to do it right the first time. My autonomy here is not negotiable. In the absence of some foolish fantasy of divine destiny, autonomy in planning our lives is essential to fulfillment. Achieving what I want means knowing what I want and planning appropriately. I should not sacrifice that autonomy for the sake of some mild and transient disapproval.


Tuesday, November 03, 2009

CFI hosted a speaker tonight.

First, it proved that the local chapter of the Center For Inquiry has odd taste in events---why a political scientist to dissect New Atheism, and a miniscule promotion campaign that only attracted CFI members and a few from the SSA?

Second, it reprised much about what I despise about criticism of the New Atheists. "You're too angry! You're too strident! Why can't you be nicer?" The speaker even began by accusing the New Atheists of being the "New Dogmatists"---he in fact proceeded to use the word "dogmatic" to describe at least three separate phenomena: first, angry dismissal of obviously false beliefs ("New Dogmatists"), second, strongly held belief without sufficient evidence (the usual definition), and third, violent militancy for ideological causes (Marxist, Islamist, Maoist dogma; what we'd usually call "fanaticism"). The third is obviously terrible, and the whole point of the New Atheists is to point out that the second is almost as bad; but to then place us in the same category, simply because we're a little "aggressive"? This is an inversion of morality that rightly angered me.

But speaking of my anger, Ewan pointed out to me that I may have become too angry in the discussion. My raised voice (though I note I never used profanity, name-calling, or really anything but logical argument delivered with vocal emphasis) may have been off-putting to some, in this case and perhaps in others as well. For all the absurdity of comparing Richard Dawkins to a suicide bomber, there was a kernel of truth in the speaker's argument---namely that perhaps our anger, however justified, might be hurting our ability to persuade. In my own case I know I anger easily when faced with foolishness, and I think this probably describes the "stridence" of Dawkins and Hitchens as well.

It's not that I get angry at those who disagree with me: Propose a competing theory of the Hard Problem, or disagree about the best approach for resolving global warming, or even debate with me about the proper time in gestation to allow abortion, and I will be civil and rational. But try to claim that there is an invisible immortal soul, or that global warming is a myth, or that zygotes deserve full human rights, and yes, I'll raise my voice at you. Some ideas are just wrong, and like Dawkins and Harris and Hitchens, I am sick of stupid ideas being respected and considered on equal terms with obvious facts.

On the other hand, it may not be working. Perhaps a calmer approach would be better. Then again, when have calm logical arguments changed history? Maybe outrage is precisely the proper response, both in principle and in practice.

I certainly don't see a lot of evidence to the contrary.



Monday, November 02, 2009

A truly excellent analysis of theology

I couldn't have said it better myself, so read it there: it's the God Conundrum.


Orthogonal versus independent: The linear algebra of truth

Philosophers are quite promiscuous in their usage of the word "orthogonal".For instance: Daniel Dennett writes in Freedom Evolves that free will and determinism are orthogonal. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "Moral anti-realism" has a section arguing that subjectivism and relativism are orthogonal. Accommodationists toward religion will often claim that science and religion are orthogonal.

What these philosophers seem to mean is that the concepts are independent, that when one changes it is not logically necessary that the other change as well. This is no doubt correct; but orthogonal is a far stronger notion than this, one which has not at all been demonstrated.

Two vectors are (linearly) independent if they are not parallel or antiparallel; similarly, two concepts are independent if they are not perfectly correlated or anticorrelated. Determinism and free will, subjectivism and relativism, science and religion, are surely independent.

But two vectors are only orthogonal if they are perpendicular, if they share no linear components whatsoever. Similarly, two concepts should only be considered orthogonal if they are completely uncorrelated. This is difficult to find in nature, though it does occur---typically in completely unrelated domains. Belief in free will is basically orthogonal to theoretical claims about dark matter.

Clearly determinism and free will are not completely uncorrelated---in theory and in practice beliefs about determinism are closely connected with beliefs about free will. Similarly, subjectivism and relativism are closely correlated, and belief in science and belief in religion are strongly anticorrelated (hence, 95% of the National Academy of Sciences is atheist or agnostic).

It's not a big deal, I suppose; but I think more consistent usage might alleviate some confusion. When one person says "orthogonal" and another objects that the two concepts aren't completely unrelated, and the first responds that this isn't what he meant... basically the two are talking past each other until both can agree about what "orthogonal" really means.



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